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Among the numerous discussions of US international broadcasting, the regional dimension in 
terms of American projects in Russia and its neighboring states are rarely given explicit con-
sideration. The paper reviews the strategies, projects, and their results in connection with US 
international broadcasting towards Russia and, more broadly, towards Eastern Europe and the 
post-Soviet space. The first section reviews the shifts in US international broadcasting during 
the period of 2013–2016, when the administration of Barack Obama introduced new strate-
gies and projects to engage the Russian audience through US international media. The second 
section demonstrates how the sanctions imposed against Moscow and investigations about 
the possible Russian impact on elections in both United States and Europe have modified 
international broadcasting in terms of introducing a new deterrence policy during the period 
of 2017–2019. The paper concludes that the United States has gained some success in reaching 
the Russian-speaking populations through international broadcasting and, moreover, its data-
driven digital diplomacy has brought some results in containing Russia’s informational activi-
ties in Eastern Europe, Balkan region, and post-Soviet countries. While the administration of 
Barack Obama conducted the policy of engagement towards the Russian-speaking world, the 
first administration of Donald Trump is pursing the policy of deterrence. 
Keywords: public diplomacy, United States, Russia, sanctions, Eastern Europe, international 
broadcasting, big data, digital diplomacy, data-driven diplomacy.
Introduction
US international broadcasting embraces an array of activities via traditional networks 
and digital space to engage people worldwide and support national objectives of foreign 
policy. US international broadcasting advances US national interests and values of Ameri-
can society by providing audiences with consistently accurate content and is comprised 
among others such networks as Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL) [1]. The international broadcasting has always responded to regional or global 
threats. Historically, the threat to American values coming from the German projects in 
the field of information and education in the Western Hemisphere during the period of 
1930s served as a trigger for making and disseminating a series of documentaries and 
animated movies in order to attract the audience in all the Latin America countries. The 
US participation in World War II led to the expansion of an informational component of 
the public diplomacy. The VOA was set allowing the government to talk about American 
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people, values, and democracy in a wide variety of countries. The cultural and ideologi-
cal confrontation with Moscow during the Cold War shaped the effective international 
broadcasting, stimulated a generous funding from the US budget, and shifted the interna-
tional broadcasting into a global project to protect American values, lifestyles, and culture. 
The VOA and REF/RL were turned out to be the most effective instrument to undermine 
the ideology of the communism and disparage the Soviet Union’s policy around the world. 
The events of the September 11, 2001, enhanced the development of new approaches to 
the US international broadcasting. The public diplomacy became much more politicized 
with its projects to promote democracy aimed mostly at leaders of pro-liberal parties and 
the opposition activists in the Middle East. A range of short-term informational cam-
paigns, political advocacy became the priority. Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa and Radio Farda 
were introduced to win the Arab audience with the ideas of democracy and liberal world. 
The propaganda in social media by various political groups and authoritarian states, as 
well as the wide exploitation of the internet in a political life have had an impact on the US 
digital diplomacy and pushed the advent of big data, data diplomacy, and, finally, artificial 
intelligence into the kingdom of the international broadcasting. The unexpected rising 
of Russia’s informational and digital activities has become a new challenge for the United 
States since 2013. Russia’s aggressive promotion of traditional values, anti-Americanism, 
and antiliberal stance are viewed as a new threat for American values and its foreign policy. 
The purpose of this study is to reveal the new trends in the US international broad-
casting determined by Russia during the period 2013–2019. The year of 2013 witnessed 
the beginnings of a new shift in the US international broadcasting driven by Russian in-
formational activity around the world, and the year of 2019 has been selected for the re-
search as much as the first outcomes in the US international broadcasting are visible and 
can be discussed.
The methodology of the study is based on elements of the theory of realism and con-
structivism. The theory of the realism allows to draw conclusions about the importance of 
national interests and security while the policy of international broadcasting is elaborated 
and conducted, and the theory of constructivism allows to illustrate how the perceptions 
of Russia shape the decision-making in the public diplomacy. The primary sources for the 
research are the documents of the US government including the bills and hearings at the 
US Congress and some reports taken from the agencies which implement some projects 
in the field. These documents are analyzed by the methods of historical and discourse 
analyses to reconstruct both perceptions of Russia among the political establishment of 
the United States and the goals of the international broadcasting in the terms of national 
security issues and the policy towards Russia. 
Before our analysis, we have to mention that despite a wide interest to the US inter-
national broadcasting and public diplomacy among scholars and experts, the question 
of the US international broadcasting towards Russia, Europe, and post-Soviet space has 
been underestimated by scholars. Most of works discusses the general problems referred 
to American soft power illustrating some historical and current insights. The Russia as 
a target country in the US international broadcasting is mainly mentioned in numerous 
books on the cultural Cold War. The period of the post-Cold War and, the periods of Ba-
rack Obama and Donald Trump administrations in particular, have still been beyond the 
scholarship [2].
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The article consists of two sections. The first section discusses the problems of the US 
international broadcasting from 2013 to 2016, and the second section reviews the foreign 
policy challenges that stimulated a new wave of transformations and shifts in the interna-
tional broadcasting since 2017 and up to the events in 2019.
Engaging the Neglected Russians, 2013–2016
Russia’s international broadcasting and digital diplomacy turned out to have been 
the core challenge for the US public diplomacy [3]. Some American experts argued that 
in the context of a reduction in funding for Russian-language broadcasting, Moscow was 
the main source of news in Russian for a global audience. Roughly, 90 percent of informa-
tion disseminated in Russian language around the world came from Russia, and the news, 
facts, and interpretations were said to be controlled by the Kremlin [4]. In addition, some 
reports stated that Russia spent about $1.4 billion per year on the Russia Today channel, 
and its audience reached 600 million viewers weekly including all traditional and digital 
platforms that, in contrast, one and a half times more than the audience of all the Ameri-
can international broadcasting channels that encompassed 345 million views weekly and 
$780 million per year [5].
Contrary to the Russia’s active international informational projects, the US inter-
national broadcasting in Russia, East Europe, and post-Soviet space was quietly fading. 
Management failures, reduced funding and the lack of clear strategies of how to attract 
the Russian-speaking population in the countries of the former socialist camp in Europe 
and the USSR had weakened the American public diplomacy. American broadcasting 
channels had lost a target audience that became grasped and influenced by the Russian 
channels. In Moscow, The RFE/RL, which played a significant and effective role in US in-
formational policy during the Cold War, reduced its staff and traditional FM radio broad-
casts hoping to switch to the digital broadcasting. However, the implementation of the 
digital strategy failed due to a lack of financial resources in 2013. A managing editor was 
not formally appointed for a long time that made the functionality of the radio station be 
very frail and allowed some employees to misuse the federal funding sources. The VOA 
broadcasting in Russian language had also many administrative flaws related to contracts, 
cash transactions, and property management. Since 2008, The VOA in Russia has had six 
chief editors that created uncertainty and lowered staff optimism. Moreover, the emphasis 
of the American public diplomacy on the Middle East has had significantly hindered the 
funding for the projects in Russia and Europe as a whole. Russia has moved to the position 
of a low-priority country in the international broadcasting and public diplomacy since 
2001. Finally, some restrictions exposed by the Russian government on American founda-
tions, agencies, and projects relative to the public diplomacy and evaluated by Moscow 
as the tools for interference in a political life contributed to the fading of the dissemina-
tion of American values through the broadcasting. Consequently, in 2013, the American 
broadcasters reached 0.1–0.3 percent of the audience (from 143,000 to 430,000 people) 
throughout Russia that was an unprecedented failure in the US public diplomacy [6].
The returning of Crimea became another important premise for the crucial revision 
of the US public diplomacy. This event was designated in the United States as “the most 
amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen” [7]. Moscow and its new infor-
mational policy was perceived as a new threat for the interests of the United States. Wash-
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ington was confronted with the fact that a significant part of Russian-speaking population 
around the world were removed from American influence and were under the influence 
of Moscow’s interpretations of the political course. The American establishment acknowl-
edged as a mistake that since end of the Cold War, Washington has regarded its position 
in Russian-American relations as a complete victorious power and thus has not made 
necessary efforts to maintain its engagement with the people who could might consume 
American message in Russian language. Russia’s soft power policy and broadcasting were 
called as a propaganda machine, and the methods applied by the Kremlin were designated 
as “weaponization of information — news and analysis as a means of provoking strong 
negative emotions, potentially leading to hatred, incitement and, ultimately, the justifi-
cation of violence” [8]. Russian propaganda was reported to create an alternative reality 
in a media-controlled space that posed a threat to democratic values. These perceptions 
became strong imperative to a new policy of international broadcasting.
Without delay, the Russian-speaking population located in post-Soviet territory, and 
in the countries of East Europe in particularly, was announced as a priority in the policy of 
international broadcasting. The laws passed the US Congress with unprecedented speed 
allocated additional millions for the support of non-governmental organizations, activists, 
internet freedom, and informational campaigns in Russia and in neighboring countries 
until 2018. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the laws have forbidden to 
engage the representatives of the Russian government in the projects of the public diplo-
macy. Political activists, oppositional groups, journalists, and bloggers have been defined 
as a target group for the public diplomacy [9; 10].
During the period of 2014–2016, the Obama administration reinvigorated the VOA 
and RFE/RL and returned them to the field of new of US — Russian competition for the 
minds and hearts of people living in the countries neighboring Russia. The additional 
appropriations allowed to renew 35 programs in Russian for the audience in post-Soviet 
space. More than seventeen new languages have been introduced in the US broadcast-
ing and among them, the language of the Crimean Tatars, a minority ethnic group in 
Crimea [11].
To reach people in Russia, the online channel known as Current Time TV was es-
tablished in October, 2014. The channel has become a pillar of the US broadcasting for 
those Russians who want tune into alternative interpretations of official news watched 
on state-controlled TV. The channel has been entirely focused on the Russian-speaking 
population and contributed enormously to the fact-checking strategy of the US broad-
casting. Almost all the “facts” distributed by the Russian television is checked and denied 
or confirmed by the Current Time. This popular strategy attracted public in the former 
Soviet republics — Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and 
Ukraine — who collaborated with the Current Time. The channel united 30 media outlets 
in these countries evaluated as the vulnerable to the Russian news. Soon, the audience of 
three American channels, namely the VOA, RFE/RL, and the Current Time, reached 4.9 % 
population in Russian in 2016, and it was a success of the US public diplomacy [12; 13].
At the same time, the reorganization of the agencies responsible for the public di-
plomacy, international broadcasting, and digital diplomacy were underway. The Board 
of Broadcasting Governors established in 1994 as a product of the post-Cold War epoch 
with the independent status from the official foreign policy aims ceased to exist, and the 
area of international broadcasting received a new agency and new rules of operation. The 
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US Agency for Global Media (further, USAGM) that reports directly to the President and 
Secretary of State, is required to disseminate information consistent with the US official 
foreign policy. Earlier, according to the law of 1994 the broadcasters had to disseminate 
the objective information relative to the United States and the target region or country. 
The law on international broadcasting in 1994 was eliminated in December 2016, when 
the president signed a new act on international broadcasting being absolutely ensured that 
the new president would be Hillary Clinton, and the direct subordination of the broad-
casters to the interests of the US foreign policy like it was during the Cold War would be 
a benefit for winning the audience with liberal discourse [14]. The unexpected victory 
of Donald Trump played a trick with international broadcasting and public diplomacy: 
The President has received the power to impact directly the content of channels, appoint 
loyal executives, and reduce the funding. In early of 2017, this law and the intentions of 
the President to cut the staff in the departments of the public affairs created additional 
problems for the US international broadcasting, digital diplomacy, and public diplomacy 
as a whole.
Summing up, we can state that the Russia’s foreign policy and its wide-scoped in-
formational activities in both traditional and digital platforms that reached millions of 
people around the world has pushed the revisions of the US international broadcasting 
during the administration of B. Obama. The president and his experts were able to revive 
the broadcasters to reach the Russian-speaking audience and to reestablish the agencies 
dealing with the international broadcasting.
Deterrence of Russian Malign Influence, 2017–2019
Through the history of public diplomacy, the American government and the exec-
utive branch in particular, has been in favor of the development of this informational 
component in foreign policy. The US President has been the main advocate of projects 
and funding for public diplomacy. For example, President Woodrow Wilson created the 
well-known the US Committee on Public Information that spread a positive image of the 
United States in various countries including Russia. President Harry Truman initiated the 
first global exchange program, and President Dwight Eisenhower convinced the Hill to 
fund the US Information Agency, a legendary community of practitioners who defeated 
the Soviet informational campaigns. As a rule, the US Congress, with some exceptions, 
was a more conservative and less responsive in terms of the funding and the expansion 
of the international broadcasting and often did not support the White House initiatives 
reducing the financial budget.
The current administration of Donald Trump is an unusual phenomenon and a chal-
lenge to the international broadcasting of the United States. The President denies the need 
for generous funding of various programs in the field. There are still problems with ap-
pointments to posts at the Department of State and embassies in the field of both inter-
national broadcasting and public diplomacy as a whole. President D. Trump and his first 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson did not perceive the public diplomacy as a significant for-
eign policy instrument. The Secretary of State articulated the intentions of his president 
to reduce funding for the offices at the Department of State, BBG, and even such crucial 
agency as the Global Engagement Center set by Barack Obama to deal with the propa-
ganda of ISIS. The President Trump did not appoint a new chief for public diplomacy 
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until December 2017 and also did not to update the staff in the field of the international 
broadcasting apparatus that traditionally is carried out by each newly elected president. 
After the departure of the democratic administration, some staff and diplomats left their 
positions in the bureaus on the public diplomacy at the Department of State, but some 
of them continued working that in many cases contributed to the survival of the public 
diplomacy. Until the end of 2017, the public diplomacy apparatus was in the hands of the 
appointee of the democratic administration. In December of 2017, the President Trump 
finally approved the new head of the department, but his career ended very quickly as 
much as he failed to fit into the framework of behavior outlined by the president. Then, 
the public diplomacy was governed by the presswoman H. Nauert but she also left the post 
in October 2018. Today, many positions are vacant and the problem with the leadership 
remains crucial, but not too important due to the fact that the most of the projects funded 
by the Congress are realized by the community of those American experts and diplomats 
who are eager to keep the international broadcasting as an effective instrument in the new 
reality of the digitalization of the world politics, cybersecurity, and social media openness 
to any propaganda.
The president’s personal digital activity is another major challenge for the interna-
tional broadcasting. Personalization of politics, emotions, the transfer of decision-making 
process to the digital space, the breaking of the media mainstream and his critics of liberal 
media have still made an important problem for the US informational projects. What 
kinds of values must be broadcasted to a foreign audience? Values of the president? How 
must the personality of the president be depictured for the audience? The international 
broadcasting has never had such a dilemma as a clash of American liberal values tradi-
tionally promoted by the US international broadcasting with the personality of the current 
president, who promotes some contradictory values. In order to deal with this problem, 
the experts in international broadcasting have reduced the number of informational flows 
about the president not to be in a situation when the official US international broadcasting 
criticizes the president.
However, such the unfriendly attitude of the president towards the international 
broadcasting has become an incentive for the community of American experts, diplo-
mats, and former grantees to promote the public diplomacy. The US Congress, contrary to 
the will and desire of the president, annually increases funding for the project in the field 
of international broadcasting, and employees and experts in this field who have not left 
government posts are involved in the renewal of the international networks to be suited 
for the digital world. Moreover, the wide and profound perception of Russia as a threat 
to the United States and Europe is proved to be a political impact for the new wave of de-
velopments in the public diplomacy. In 2017, the Congress, not the White House, raised 
the question on the necessity to increase the funding for the international broadcasting. 
Instead of $667 million requested by the White House the for international broadcasting 
programs, the Congress allocated $780 million [15].
By early 2018, after the US Congress had discussed the possible interference of Russia 
in the elections in the United States and Europe within the numerous hearings, the public 
diplomacy discourse towards Moscow began changing again [4]. Instead of the previous 
statements about the necessity on winning Russian-speaking population and the Kremlin 
propaganda, the discourse on Russian malign influence began dominating in governmen-
tal documents, mass-media, and in reports of American experts. They claimed that Russia 
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has conducted at least 362 informational and malign operations targeting 41 European 
countries since 2000 [16]. The investigations of the possible interference of Russia in the 
2016 presidential elections in the United States and the findings submitted by the Google, 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube corporations to the public have modified the imperative 
of the international broadcasting. Such information that Russia created up to 470 Face-
book pages for American citizens and they were seen by 126  million Americans, with 
29 million users engaging in some action with the posts, notably sharing, liking, or writing 
a comment has transformed the discourse on the winning the hearts and minds in Russia 
by the discourse on the deterrence of Russian soft power [4].
The discourse on the malign influence became a new foundation for the US interna-
tional broadcasting and was defined as “the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized ap-
plication of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, business, corruption, 
educational, and other capabilities by hostile foreign powers to foster attitudes, behav-
iors, decisions, or outcomes within the United States” [17]. Russia has been depictured in 
the documents as the country that posed threats including influence operations targeting 
America and the Western world. Hence, the budget relative to the international broadcast-
ing prioritized the policy of countering Russian malign influence in Europe and Eurasia 
since 2018 [18]. The countries of East Europe and Eurasia were named as the most vul-
nerable and thus be supported through the projects of the international broadcasting and 
public diplomacy.
Consequently, for the first time since the end Cold War, the US government has cre-
ated a special area in the international broadcasting to conduct the counter-propaganda 
against Russia in the countries of East Europe. The informational deterrence of Russia was 
intertwined with the sanctions imposed on Moscow. The international broadcasting and 
public diplomacy has strongly been connected for the first time to the sanctions’ policy 
and lost its soft essence to build bridges and develop a cooperation, but not to destroy the 
people-to-people relations. The famous law on the sanctions  — Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act — allocated $250 million for a project called as the 
Countering Russian Influence Fund in Europe for 2018 and 2019 in order to contain the 
information coming from Russia. For 2020, the figure of $275–280 million has being dis-
cussed among the experts’ community [19; 20].
The projects in the field of the building of democratic structures and credible elec-
tions in Europe and Eurasia, including Russia, grew significantly and became prioritized 
in the public diplomacy up to the mid-2019. The appropriations acts dealing with the 
foreign policy designates that “funds are available to support democracy programs in 
the Russian Federation, including to promote Internet freedom and rule of law strategy” 
[15]. The term ‘‘democracy programs’’ is defined as “programs that support good govern-
ance, credible and competitive elections, freedom of expression, association, assembly, 
and religion, human rights, labor rights, independent media, and the rule of law, and 
that otherwise strengthen the capacity of democratic political parties, governments, non-
governmental organizations and institutions, and citizens to support the development of 
democratic states and institutions that are responsive and accountable to citizens” [15].
The key agencies for implementing the new strategy is the Human Rights and De-
mocracy Fund of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department 
of State, the National Endowment for Democracy and other organizations subordinated 
to the Foggy Bottom. These organizations can retrieve some funds from the additional 
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budget allocated by three separate funds as $157.7 million, $89,6 million and $69.5 mil-
lion available until September, 2020, in order to implement special and additional pro-
grams to protect democracy in Europe and in Russia itself. A separate fund is appropriated 
to in the traditional public diplomacy and democracy programs as the Freedom Support 
Act 1992 and the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989. The programs 
received $760,334,000, until September, 2020, and they have also been increased [20].
Other important component of the new policy is the protection of civil society activ-
ists and journalists. This policy has been actively used since the second administration of 
Barack Obama. Governmental and non-governmental organizations have been created to 
help the opposition in Russia and other countries. An amount of $15 million is allocated 
on supporting and protecting civil society activists and journalists who have been threat-
ened, harassed or attacked. Moreover, such a new direction in public diplomacy as foren-
sic anthropological assistance related to the exhumation and identification of victims of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide has been funded by $10 million [20].
Finally, the US agency for International Development, a traditional agency respon-
sible for promoting democracy, credible elections, and supporting of non-governmental 
organizations around the world are reported to have spent about 1.3–1.5 billion dollars 
for democracy and public diplomacy in Europe and Eurasia since 2018. The projects deal 
with the support of independent media in Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia to increase 
their resilience to pressure and misinformation coming from Russia. Financing in the me-
dia space consists of following main activities: media literacy, increased access to objective 
information, capacity building and strategic communications [21].
The sanctions against Russia and the enlarged funding have contributed to signifi-
cantly upgrading and reviving the international broadcasting in terms of huge support 
of the USAGM. This agency received an unprecedented amount of $804 million to de-
velop programming of the channels dealing with Europe and Russia in 2019 [1]. The VOA 
and RFE/RL were tuned into digital platforms, Internet television, and even into financial 
sources for arranging of various seminars for citizens from Eastern Europe and Eurasia in-
cluding Russia. The target audience of these channels has significantly increased through 
the expansion of content for young people.
The additional funding for the new data-driven methods in analyzing the target 
audience and shaping a message has helped the USAGM to reach a weekly audience of 
345 million people across radio, television, and the internet. The RFE/RL websites were 
visited by 508 million times representing a 15 percent increase from the year of 2017. The 
number of video views across YouTube doubled in 2018 when compared to 2017 reaching 
more than 1.0 billion views [1].
The cementing of the of informational deterrence along with the perimeter of Rus-
sia became the main tactics of the US international broadcasting during the period of 
2018–2019. The countries of the Balkan Peninsula and East Europe where Russia tries to 
increase its influence are said to be a priority in this new policy. В 2018, a newswire for 
the Balkans was established. RFE/RL’s Balkan Service is reported to engage the vibrant 
but very often not friendly populations in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and 
Kosovo. The RFE/RL relaunched its Romanian Service after leaving the country a decade 
ago. The service, known locally as Radio Europa Liberă, was aimed at the dissecting the 
Russian informational flows in Romania and in Moldova [22]. Moreover, the VOA and 
its Albanian Service in particular, tries engage and influence people Albania, Kosovo, and 
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the Albanian-speaking areas of Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro, which are reported 
to be “vulnerable to internal and external destabilizing forces, including Russian influ-
ence” [23].
Macedonia and Serbia are the main countries where the informational projects of 
both the United States and Russia are clashed. The United States is trying to return the 
audience after several years of the absence of its informational, educational, and cultur-
al programs. However, coverage problems remain. For example, VOA Albanian TV and 
digital content reaches only 7.2 percent in Macedonia and VOA Bosnian Service reaches 
13.4 population in Macedonia, and the VOA Macedonian Service reaches 19 percent of 
adults in Macedonia every week that lower than in the other counties of East Europe [23]. 
VOA Serbian is distributed through 50 national and regional affiliates and online reached 
12 percent of adults weekly. In order to eliminate the Russian informational activities, the 
VOA produced documentary series and general information on Russia’s growing influ-
ence in Serbia including soft power, media, culture, politics, and Serbia’s energy depend-
ency on Russia [23]. The news provides American views on Russian pressure on Monte-
negro and on the process of Montenegro’s accession to NATO. In Montenegro, the VOA 
is able to dominate the news cycle with national TV and online coverage providing cost-
benefit analysis of the country’s membership in NATO. However, some American experts 
involved in this activity state that it is extremely difficult to deter Russia throughout the 
space of her former peripheries since there are many Russian-speaking people, and Russia 
has a strong influence on the media [24].
The NATO is designated as the main partner for the US public diplomacy projects. 
The main area of the NATO’s contribution is the opening the informational centers that 
track and publish materials on Russian activities in social media and thus the elaborating 
messages to attract users in the Russian-language segment of the Internet. Centers such as 
the EU East Strat-Com Task Force monitor Russian media and generate a quick response 
to tweets or posts of Russian-speaking bloggers on social networks [24]. Strat-Comm dis-
seminates positive narratives on the United States and its allies and partners and tries to 
refute Russian narratives and to build resilience among foreign audiences to recognize 
disinformation.
Moreover, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenia and Georgian services are the 
main tools to counter the propaganda around Russia. They carry out a wide variety of 
projects both in the informational area and in the field of training journalists, political 
consultants, etc. The notion “international broadcasting” has just been enlarged in terms 
of its functions. The traditional radio and TV channels have been mostly converted into 
digital platforms that not only inform in one-way, but also engage in dialogue with the 
public through discussing in comments, posting videos from users and financing a wide 
variety of projects in the target country.
The innovation in the US international broadcasting was a new type of opinion re-
search through the analysis of the big data implemented by organizations such as the na-
tional Democratic Institute or International Republic Institute in European countries in 
order to define audience that are most vulnerable to Russian campaigns and to respond 
with messages that that build resilience [25]. For example, in Moldova, the project as the 
Building Capacity to Produce Alternatives to Russian Television has been accomplished. 
The project supported independent media in Moldova to bolster local capacity to develop 
compelling television content. Americans brought Hollywood talent to Moldova to train 
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a new generation of screenwriters from Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, and Romania 
[1]. A Sarajevo-based organization supported by the National Endowment Foundation led 
Southeast Europe’s leading fact-checking and investigative reporting organizations. They 
track and debunk disinformation and promote alternative news and analysis that challenges 
illiberal narratives. The Foundation works with groups in Serbia, Montenegro, and North 
Macedonia to produce attractive content and to identify misleading or false one.
Moreover, the most popular project in this new international broadcasting purposely 
created for the Russian-speaking population of the post-Soviet space is called as the media 
literacy. The project was reported to build information consumption critical skills. The 
IREX, the well-known agency for managing the academic exchanges between the United 
States and the countries of East Europe and Soviet Union since 1960s, has implemented 
the project in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Russia, and other countries. The project called 
Learn to Discern educate the population on how to watch or read news coming from 
Russia or in Russian [26]. The IREX arranges seminars and conveys the basics of media 
literacy to a wide range of consumers. The simple handouts and street posters have been 
created to convey to the audience a distinction between information and propaganda. 
The most fascinating outcomes are visible in Ukraine, where the project reached several 
million people through shuttle training and an extensive advertising campaign. The semi-
nars brought together a variety of citizens of Ukraine in terms of their social and profes-
sional strata. Pensioners, the youth, activists, teachers, and journalists were selected from 
14 regions of the eastern and southern parts in Ukraine. According to the documents, 
the citizens of western and central part in Ukraine have not been involved in the training 
as much as they are not regular consumers of Russian-language information. Each par-
ticipant of the seminars had to transfer their knowledge and skills to another six citizens. 
Consequently, these seminars, advertisements on TV channels, and large-scale education-
al materials disseminated in public places covered 20 million viewers, 8 million listeners, 
10 million subscribers on the YouTube platform [27]. This project has become a model for 
other post-Soviet countries. For example, in Moldova, a similar project was implemented 
by the Deutsche Welle [28]. In Russia, the Current Time joined the project by distributing 
the See in Both Sides show, the authors of which conduct a comparative analysis of news 
coming from both Russia and Ukraine [26]. The American experts stated that Embassy 
public affairs sections support Learn to Discern programs in Ukraine, Serbia and other 
countries in the region. It was reported that in Ukraine, following intensive media literacy 
training in 50 secondary schools, theappreciation for professional journalism increased by 
12 percent; the number of participants who considered themselves capable of recogniz-
ing quality media increased by 36 percent; and those willing to seek out quality reporting 
increased by 41 percent. Moreover, the Ministry of Education is working with the Depart-
ment of State to scale up this program to all the schools by 2021 [21]. However, the experts 
warn that all these projects can have a not very long-term success as far as there are too 
many people have strong ties with Russia and speak Russian [24].
Consequently, the US international broadcasting has significantly improved its popu-
larity in the post-Soviet Union space including Russia. We have mentioned above that in 
2013, only about 0.1–0.3  percent of Russia’s population listened to or watched Ameri-
can broadcasting channels weekly. In 2017, the measured weekly audience of RFE/RL’s 
Russian-language content and Current Time reached 6.4 percent of Russians or nearly 
6.6 million people [1]. All the USAGM content on TV, radio and online including mainly 
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Current Time, RFE/RL, and VOA was consumed by 7.7 percent of adults each week, or 
7.9 million people. [29], [5] If we compare the current percent with the audience percent 
in the Soviet Union under conditions of heavy jamming, than contemporary figures can-
not be depictured as a success of the US public diplomacy. The RFE/RL and VOA reached 
around 10 percent of audience in the Soviet Union. Some more optimistic sources state 
about 30-40 percent of audience during the Cold War [30].
Current Time’s news reporting in social networks attract audiences aged 15–24. 
The channel engaged savvy, younger audiences on social, economic and political issues 
that state media ignores [17]. The primary target audience is so called Generation Z that 
is digital young generation who have largely experienced political life under Russia’s 
current political system. In order to reached them, topics include education (studying 
in America), new technologies, the future of work, and the Kremlin’s manipulation of 
the media. According to the reports, the Current Time’s “impact on the Russian media 
landscape was on display as recently as February 6, when popular Russian YouTube host 
Yury Dud’ cited a Current Time program about hardship in one Kurile military town to 
challenge Kremlin propaganda chief Dmitry Kiselyov about his own TV show’s avoid-
ance of such coverage” [31]. The interview has registered over 6.7 million views since it 
was posted to YouTube [31].
The years of 2018 and 2019 witnessed the revival of the popularity of the VOA in 
social media. From June 2018 to June 2019, the VOA Russian Service website registered 
an average of 2 million monthly visits and 2.5 million monthly article views. Videos on 
VOA Russian’s digital platforms garnered 147 million views on Facebook and 12.7 million 
views on YouTube. Facebook is the Service’s most active social media outreach platform, 
receiving about 1 million post engagements daily [17].
Finally, the North Caucasus region, Tatarstan, and Bashkiria were also involved in 
the international broadcasting. The RFE/RL provides programming in local languages its 
North Caucasus Language Service and its Tatar-Bashkir Service. The Tatar-Bashkir Ser-
vice is the only major international news provider in the Tatar and Bashkir languages. The 
service’s primary reporting output is in the Tatar language, which is reported to be critical 
in the strategy of the United states to contain a Russification launched by the Kremlin as 
it is perceived by the American establishment.
Digital diplomacy of Russia that, according to American experts, contributed to the 
victory of Donald Trump, is under the response by such agency as the Global Engage-
ment Center (further, GEC). The GEC created by the Obama Administration in order to 
deal with the ISIS’s propaganda in social media, has currently expanded its functions and 
is responsible for creating counter-messages against Russian active bloggers. The center 
accumulates data on the information activity in Russia and elaborates the strategy for 
American digital diplomacy. National Defense Authorization Acts broadened the GEC’s 
mission to “lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts to understand and counter foreign 
state and non-state propaganda and disinformation” [14]. There are nearly 90 personnel 
who track and respond to Russian digital projects. The new functions have been gener-
ously funded by the US Congress. If in 2015 and 2016 Center received about $5 million 
for its activities from the federal budget, then today — about $80 million annually until 
2024 [19]. A special position — SARMAT or Senior Advisor for Russian Malign Activities 
and Threat — has been created at GEC for revealing and disparaging the activities of Rus-
sian channels, bloggers, and etc. [32].
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Moreover, and more important, The GEC has established Technology Demonstra-
tion Series to convene technological solutions in the fight against disinformation. Since 
mid-2018, the GEC has hosted more than 20 demos of technologies aimed at removing 
malign propaganda and disinformation. The Series regularly includes observers from the 
Department of State and Department of Defense, the USAGM, and European embassies 
[33]. The informational broadcasting has moved to the application of such new technolo-
gies as bot network detection, blockchain-enabled content authentication, and counter-
messaging automation. Definitely, these technologies would open a new prospective for 
the digital diplomacy. The international broadcasters will use the improved metrics with 
real-time monitoring tools allowing content to be quickly adapted and distributed to align 
with audience interests. The informational broadcasting will be able to identify propagan-
da technologies; define technological vulnerabilities of disinformation operations; predict 
adversaries’ adaptations to US efforts to counter foreign fake information and provide 
solutions to the challenges posed by adversarial networks like deepfakes [34]. In 2018, 
the GEC spent $40  million specifically for initiatives to counter Russian news includ-
ing deploying technology to provide early warnings of disinformation; analyzing those 
foreign audiences that are most susceptible to or targeted by disinformation; developing 
partnerships with key local messengers to produce content to reach critical audiences; and 
building the technical skills of civil society organizations, NGOs, and journalists to shed 
light on the spread of disinformation.
The United States has implemented a new project to deepen understanding of the 
scope and nature of Russian information across 13 Central and East European countries. 
The project has built resistance to disinformation in the most vulnerable European socie-
ties by increasing direct person-to-person engagement on this issue. The project has ena-
bled the civil society organizations to identify and respond to disinformation in locally-
relevant ways. Online analytics has been integrated in the daily activities of local media 
and NGOs that provided the GEC with tools and capabilities to understand Russian activ-
ities in the European countries. North Macedonia, Bulgaria, other countries received the 
primary attention. The US government works closely with local social media’s influenc-
ers and help improve their skills that could effectively counter the Russian informational 
flows [24]. Consequently, the intergovernmental network of digital diplomacy practition-
ers is being setting up in East Europe and the Balkans [23].
These digital projects and data-driven public diplomacy has contributed to the policy 
of revealing some suspicious accounts to Facebook, which are removed ahead of any im-
portant political event like elections. This approached was applied in Ukraine during the 
presidential election in 2019 [21]. In Montenegro, a digital forensic center was supported 
in order to monitor and analyze disinformation targeted at Montenegrin audiences and to 
provide related media literacy training. According to the documents, the center’s analysis 
highlighted, for example, evidence of Russian involvement “in a local protest designed to 
stoke ethnic tensions and added to the Department’s understanding of continued Russian 
aims to destabilize Montenegro” [21].
Among new technologies mentioned above, the artificial intelligence will crucially 
modify the essence of the international broadcasting. Artificial intelligence tools are re-
ported to provide better insights into audience behavior and trends, detect anomalous be-
havior, detect misinformation campaigns, fraud detection, and aid content creators. The 
creation of the so-called chatbot 24/7/365 would replace not only hundreds of employees 
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of the departments of digital diplomacy, but also would make impact on the discussions 
of millions of Internet users in all languages of the world.
The other prospective changes in both informational and digital projects are outlined 
in the bill on the new sanctions package known as the Defending American Security from 
Kremlin Aggression Act. The bill was introduced in August 2018, but was postponed and 
discussed in February 2019 before the Munich Security Conference. The bill has currently 
passed the Senate and publicly known as the DETER Act. The articles of the bill assure 
the support of NATO strengthening European unity and new sanctions against Moscow. 
The second section proposes new reforms of the international broadcasting’s institutions 
to deter Russia and calls “for the establishment of a National Fusion Center to Respond to 
Hybrid Threats <…> to be used in countries vulnerable to Russian malign influence, and 
closer coordination with allies” [35]. The bill fixes the use of digital platforms and big data 
analysis to engage effectively the target audience, and cybersecurity policy is proposed 
to be coordinated with the digital diplomacy in order to disseminate information and 
remove the adversaries’ posts from social networks [17].
Summing up, we can state that during the period of 2017–2019 the US international 
broadcasting endured new and crucial transformations determined by the national secu-
rity goals and perceptions of Russia. Russia is the factor that contributed to the crucial re-
visions in the apparatus, funding, and new technological shifts in the international broad-
casting of the United States. The new data driven technologies are introduced to reach so 
called vulnerable audience, track the fakes, and create effective messages.
Conclusion
The theories of realism and constructivism allow to reveal both national security im-
peratives and the perceptions of Russia as a threat and adversary that both define the 
policy of the international broadcasting. We argue that mostly the discussions about the 
Russian informational measures, its rising as a digital power, and the findings about pos-
sible Russian malign interference have determined the transformations in the American 
public diplomacy and international broadcasting.
During the period of 2013–2019, The United States has profoundly improved pre-
vious the quality of the content and audience reach in the regions of East Europe and 
post-Soviet space. The United States has managed to return the target audience in Russia 
making almost forgotten Cold War relics as the VOA and RFE/RL be attractive, dynamic, 
and digital. During the second administration of Barack Obama, Russia was designated as 
target, and the international broadcasting conducted the policy of engagement towards the 
Russian-speaking world attracting the people around the world who understand Russian 
language.
The revelations on Russia’s possible interference in the United States and Europe’s 
election campaigns during the first administration of Donald Trump have revised the 
previous perception of Russia. Instead of the traditional target for the US international 
broadcasting Russia has been postured as a threat that requires pursing the policy of deter-
rence. The policy of deterrence has been culminated in expanding the digital diplomacy 
of the United States and in exploiting the data-driven methods to erode the Russian in-
formational activities within the national clusters of the Internet and social media in the 
countries of the Balkan region, East Europe, and former Soviet republics.
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The US informational broadcasting has passed fast, but historic transformation, 
namely from the strategy referred to the winning of the Russian-speaking audience to 
the policy of deterrence of Russian influence in its nearest neighboring spaces during 
2013–2019. The effectiveness of the new informational broadcasting policy will depend 
on the skillful exploitation of new technologies in terms of data-driven methods.
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